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CURRENT LEGISLATION
involving real property) to have a limitation of actions thereon
exceeding six years. In spite of the fiction that full justice is
awarded by the courts and that the allowance of costs to the success-
ful plaintiff is payment in full for the trouble and expense to which
he has been put in prosecuting his suit, there should be some method
of settling a liquidated claim or demand by payment of less than the
full amount due.40  Perhaps, so long as the seal retains any of its
other significations, the authority of an agent to affix it should be
equally solemn and formal.
But means to accomplish these and any other desirable ends
should be attained by some method appropriate thereto. The fact
that a long Statute of Limitations is appropriate in one transaction is
no justification for adding fourteen years thereto in another merely
because the letters "L.S." happen to be printed on the paper on
which it is recorded. That accords neither with common sense, the
intention of the parties nor the purpose of the Statute of Limitations.
The United States Supreme Court said over half a century ago that
a sealed instrument "binds the parties by force of the natural pre-
sumption that an instrument executed with so much deliberation and
solemnity is founded upon some sufficient cause." 47 Today no one
will honestly believe or seriously contend that there exists any such
''natural presumption."
It is submitted that, rather than continuing to pursue the course
followed for the last one hundred years and more, of now and then
essaying some infringement on the domain of the seal, and then a
few years later amending and changing the degree of the infringe-
ment, the better and only proper course would be to do away entirely
with this now decrepit remnant of ancient law; and in those cases
where it is still serving some useful purpose, to provide a more
logical and modern means of accomplishing the same end.
WESLEY DAVIS.
THE WAR ON CRIME.-In recent years, the problem of dealing
with crime and criminals has become a major one, and it has become
increasingly evident that the old laws and methods were ineffective
to battle the new type of criminals. Prior to the repeal of the Pro-
hibition laws, the leaders in the movement for repeal declared that
those laws were responsible for the increase in and prevalence of
crime, and held forth the hope that with the repeal, crime would
cease. However, there was no instantaneous change-in fact, there
"6 The present amendment has done away with the use of the sealed receipt
or release as a means of settling out of court many claims, without substituting
anything in place thereof. This will work a hardship on attorneys and clients
alike. Means may be devised, such as giving a worthless chattel or the promise
of a third person, as a part of the consideration. Whether or not the courts
will countenance a too bare-faced subterfuge remains to be seen.
"' Storm v. United States, 94 U. S. 76, 24 L. ed. 42 (1876).
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was no sign that there was even a lessening, and the need for further
action was apparent.
Perhaps the most important of the measures enacted by the New
York State Legislature in 1935 is the so-called "Public Enemy"
Law.' This is an amendment to subdivision 11 of Section 722 of
the Penal Law, which declares that any person of evil reputation or
engaged in an illegal occupation who is found consorting with other
persons of like reputation, with an illegal purpose, shall be deemed
to have committed the offense of disorderly conduct, the new amend-
ment adding "In any prosecution under this section, the fact the
defendant is engaged in an illegal occupation or bears an evil repu-
tation and is found consorting with persons of like evil reputation,
thieves or criminals shall be prima facie evidence that such consorting
was for an unlawful purpose." This amendment is to remain in
force for one year.
This is by far the most drastic step yet to be taken in an effort
to control the activities of the habitual criminal. It is of course a
complete reversal of the attitude heretofore taken in the prosecution
of criminals, in that the prosecution is enabled to start out with the
presumption that the persons found consorting, provided that they
are both of evil reputation or have criminal records, were doing so
for an unlawful purpose, and the defense now has the onus of rebut-
ting that presumption. There is always a general distrust of the
new, especially where it makes so radical a change in an old-established
order.
The immediate objection to be raised is that such a provision is
a violation of the rights of the defendant to be presumed innocent
unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The constitution-
ality of this new amendment has already been passed upon by inferior
courts in several cases 2 where the defendants raised that objection.
In both cases, the defendants were charged with consorting for an
unlawful purpose, evidence introduced to show that they were of an
evil reputation, and then the duty was put upon the defendants to
show that their consorting was not for an illegal purpose. This they
were unable to do, and they were therefore convicted.
Although the constitutionality of this amendment to the Penal
Law has been passed upon, this is not conclusive since it was by
inferior courts. Before its passage, the Law Revision Commission
expressed the opinion a that this proposed amendment, if passed,
IN. Y. Laws of 1935, c. 921. This provision originally enacted in 1931,
c. 793, amended Laws of 1932, c. 58, omitting the last sentence creating the
presumption, and police officials found it difficult, and in most cases impossible,
to prove the illegal purpose. Therefore the legislature amended the law as
above set forth to give the people the benefit of the presumption.
2 People v. Arcidiaco and Spitale, 156 Misc. 461 (App. T. Ct. of Spec.
Sess. 1935); People v. Berman et aL., 156 Misc. 463 (App. T. Ct. of Spec.
Sess. 1935).
1 LEGISLATIVE DoCUMENT, 1935, No. 60K.
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would be unconstitutional because it violated the "due process"
clauses 4 and because it was too indefinite.
The legislature may pass a statute providing that proof of one
fact shall constitute prina facie evidence of the existence of another
fact essential to the guilt of the accused, without violating any con-
stitutional rights,5 but there are limitations 6 to the creation of such
presumptions. There must be some natural and fair connection
between the fact proved and the main fact in question. It cannot
be a purely arbitrary presumption.7 This test, however, is met by
the statute in question. When dealing with habitual criminals and
they are apprehended consorting together at various times and places,
the inference that they are doing so for an unlawful purpose is not
unnatural or unfair.
The legislature, of course, has the power 8 to enact laws shifting
the duty of going forward with the evidence., This does not take
away the burden of proving that the accused is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.10 Before the presumption that the consorting was
for an unlawful purpose arises, the prosecution must prove that the
defendants are of evil reputation or that they are engaged in an
illegal occupation. The defendants are then given an opportunity to
show, if they can, that their purpose was not unlawful. The produc-
tion of satisfactory evidence sufficient to rebut the statutory presump-
tion is, however, a difficult and sometimes impossible task. Similar
statutes in other states have been held unconstitutional and void
because they violated the constitutional requirement of "due process"
and because they were considered too indefinte.11
A necessary part of the proof required in order to establish the
'U. S. CoNsr. 5TH and 14TH AMENDMENTS.
'People v. Adams, 176 N. Y. 351, 68 N. E. 636 (1903), aff'd, Adams v.
N. Y., 192 U. S. 585, 24 Sup. Ct. 416 (1904); People v. Cannon, 139 N. Y.
32, 34 N. E. 759 (1893).
Ibid.
7State v. Griffin, 154 N. C. 611, 614, 70 S. E. 292 (1911) (A statute
establishing such presumption where there is no rational connection, and the
presumption is purely arbitrary is unreasonable and void).
'Bank of Chenango v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467 (1863) (The legislative power
in this state is absolute and unlimited, except by restrictions of the Con-
stitution).
' The Board of Commissioners of Excise of the City of Auburn v. Mer-
chant, 103 N. Y. 143, 8 N. E. 484 (1886) (A statute prescribing rules of evi-
dence in either civil or criminal cases which leaves a party a fair opportunity to
make his defense and to submit all the facts to the jury to be weighed by
them upon evidence legitimately bearing upon them cannot be assailed on
constitutional grounds).
"People v. Cannon, 139 N. Y. 32, 34 N. E. 759 (1893) (A provision of
this kind does not change the burden of proof. The people must at all times
sustain the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable
doubt) ; Casey v. United States, 276 U. S. 413, 48 Sup. Ct. 373 (1928).
"People v. Belcastro, 356 I1. 144, 190 N. E. 301 (1934) ; People v. Alterie,
356 I1. 307, 190 N. E. 305 (1934); People v. Licavolie, 264 Mich. 643, 250
N. W. 520 (1933). Contra: State v. Bulot, 175 La. 21, 142 So. 787 (1932) (An
act forbidding persons to "unlawfully assemble for any unlawful purpose" was
not too indefinite, although it was held unconstitutional for another reason).
1935]
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presumption is that the defendants are of evil reputation. Reputa-
tion may be created by malicious gossip, unfounded rumors exag-
gerated in repetition and the like, and to allow such evidence is
manifestly unfair.1 2 Also, in the interpretation of the statute, the
word "criminal" must be construed. Undoubtedly, the intention was
to designate one whose conduct is habitually criminal. However, in
order to secure the conviction, it might be construed in its strictly
technical sense to mean one who has been convicted of a felony or
one convicted of any crime. If taken in the latter sense, then a
person convicted of a traffic violation, for instance, would be consid-
ered a criminal.
If this provision is applied to carry out the intention for which
it was passed, namely, to prevent future crime, it should be allowed
to stand, because it would prove an aid in an attempt to abort criminal
activities. However, the danger is that there may be attempted a use
of this law in order to punish individuals who, while they are not
guilty under this law, are suspected of guilt in other connections,
which suspicions cannot be proved.
Another aid to the state in the prosecution of criminals is the
new Section 295-1 to the Code of Criminal Procedure 13 which
requires that, on demand, a defendant indicted by a grand jury must
furnish, if he intends to offer an alibi as a defense, a bill of particu-
lars stating the place or places he claims to have been and also the
names and addresses of his witnesses. In the event that such a bill
of particulars is not served and filed, all testimony in reference to
an alibi may be excluded, in the discretion of the court. If allowed,
the prosecuting officer may obtain an adjournment of three days.
This takes away no substantive right of the accused, but does protect
the prosecution from a surprise alibi and enables it to prepare
therefor.
A further attempt to limit the use of firearms by private indi-
viduals is made in another law 14 passed this year. This is an
amendment to Section 1897, subdivision 9a, of the Penal Law, and
applies only to New York City. It states that no license to carry a
revolver shall be valid in the city of New York, unless such license
has been issued by the Police Commissioner of that city or a special
permit has been issued by him giving a license such validity. The
New York City Police Department has long complained 15 that many
"Hammond v. State of Ohio, 78 Ohio State 15, 84 N. E. 416 (1908).
" N. Y. Laws of 1935, c. 506.
"N. Y. Laws of 1935, c. 508.
11 "No longer will a prisoner charged with violation of the Sullivan Law
be able to offer an up-state license as a defense. Our records are full of
instances wherein gangsters legally carried guns because under false names
they managed to obtain licenses outside of New York City. Salvador Spitale,
Frankie Yale, Jake (Legs) Diamond, Arthur (Dutch Schultz) Flegenheimer,
Harry Kirschenbaum-such men as these have been picked up on the streets
carrying weapons and have flaunted pistol licenses in the face of the examining
magistrate or of the arresting officer." Interview with Police Commissioner
Valentine, N. Y. Times, May 5, 1935, §4, at 1.
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individuals apprehended have been carrying licenses issued in some
small town up-state, obtained under a false name. A measure of this
sort can meet with no objection and should be of benefit to the
administration of law and order in the city.
However, in order to balance the benefits, there has been passed
a law 16 creating a bureau of investigation in the division of state
police. It gives to rural communities which have no detective force
or other facilities for the detection and prevention of crime the aid
of experts, scientists, technicians and other qualified persons.
Another problem which has long been under consideration is
that of the present bail system. Prisoners could be admitted to bail
in any number of places where there was no way of checking into
their criminal record, and the result was that one criminal might be
admitted to bail many times, during a short period of time, with
many charges pending against him. In many instances, the criminal
found that it paid him to forfeit his bail and continue his criminal
activities in other jurisdictions.
In order to combat this, the Code of Criminal Procedure was
amended in 1926, by Section 552a, intended primarily for New York
City, which provided that "no person charged with a felony or with
any of the misdemeanors or offenses specified in the preceding
section shall be admitted to bail until his finger prints shall be taken
to ascertain whether he has previously been convicted of crime." This
section was made effective on April 16th, and only ten days later
was declared unconstitutional, 17 altlough by an inferior court, on the
ground that it violated the due process of law. Although there was
no express provision that a prisoner could be compelled to be finger-
printed, this would be implied, and such finger-printing would be an
encroachment against the liberty of person. Also, the provision
regarding excessive bail 18 would be violated, since this includes
denial of bail or "its hedging in with conditions which are impracti-
cal, unreasonable or onerous of performance." 19 With the recent
campaign for compulsory finger-printing of the entire population as
a means of crime detection and prevention,20 it is a question whether
this law would meet a like fate if enacted at the present time.
In 1928, the Penal Law was amended 21 providing that one
admitted to bail in connection with a charge of felony and who fails
to appear as required, thereby forfeiting his bail, is also guilty of a
felony if he fails to appear within thirty days. This year, this
provision was further amended 2 2 making a person admitted to bail
'IN. Y. Laws of 1935, c. 697.
'
1 People v. Hevern, 127 Misc. 141, 215 N. Y. Supp. 412 (1926).
U. S. CONST. 8TH AMENDMENT; N. Y. CONST. art. I, §5.
19 People v. Hevern, 127 Misc. 141, 215 N. Y. Supp. 412 (1926).
Conference on Crime, sponsored by Gov. Lehman, held at Albany, N. Y.,
Oct. 1 to 4, 1935.
IN. Y. PENAL LAW §1694A.
N. Y. Laws of 1935, c. 275.
19351
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in connection with various offenses 23 under the Penal Law and the
Code of Criminal Procedure, directed at known habitual criminals,
prostitutes and vagrants, guilty of a misdemeanor if he fails to
appear within fifteen days, thereby forfeiting his bail.
Regarding bail after conviction, pending appeal, here we find
that the tendency has always been to be stricter and there are more
considerations to limit the judicial discretion.2 4 If there is a reason-
able doubt as to whether the judgment of conviction will be affirmed
on appeal, the appellant is entitled to be admitted to bail pending the
decision of the appellate court.25 The rule has been laid down that
"The court in exercising its discretion to admit accused to bail
pending appeal should consider probabilities of reversal of convic-
tion, personal circumstances of accused and his personal attitude
toward society as organized in government." 26 However, where
there is reason to believe that an appeal is being taken merely in
order to delay the punishment of the defendant, bail after conviction
should be refused.2 7 In an address to the American Law Institute,
2 8
Chief Justice Hughes said, "While there should be a proper oppor-
tunity for appeal where substantial questions are presented, there is
no reason why review of convictions should not be prompt. The
spectacle of persons convicted of crime at large on bail pending
unnecessary delays on appeal brings the processes of the courts into
public contempt."
Section 555 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which governs
who shall be allowed bail after conviction and where there has been
a stay of proceedings pending appeal, has this year been amended 29
to deny bail to a defendant convicted of a charge under Section 552
of the Code and who is circumstanced as therein described. This
provision will only affect a defendant who has been convicted of a
felony or who has been convicted twice of any of the misdemeanors
or offenses mentioned therein,30 and then only after he has already
been convicted.
"3N. Y. PENAL LAW §722, subds. 6 or 11; N. Y. CoDE OF CRIM. PRoc.
§887, subds. 4 or 10; §898a.
People v. Van Home, 8 Barb. 158 (1850) (At common law, all
offenses including treason, murder and other felonies were bailable before
indictment found, although bail in the case of capital offenses was a matter
within the discretion of the court. However, this discretion is purely ajudicial discretion and the court should be guided in its exercise by the
circumstances of the case and the rules of law applicable to such circum-
stances).
25N. Y. CODE OF CRIM. PRoc. §527; People v. Kaplan, 147 Misc. 752, 264
N. Y. Supp. 542 (1933).
= Circuit Court of Appeals Rule 15 for the Third Circuit.
= See United States v. Motlow, 10 F. (2d) 657 (C. C. A. 7th, 1926).
'AmERICAN BAR AssoCIATION JOURNAL, June, 1934.
I N. Y. Laws of 1935, c. 507.
=Illegally using, carrying or possessing a pistol or other dangerous
weapon; making or possessing burglars' instruments; buying or receiving stolen
property; unlawful entry of a building; aiding escape from prison; that kind
of disorderly conduct defined in subd. 6 of §722, N. Y. PENAL LAW (interferes
with any person in any place by jostling against such person or unnecessarily
[ VOL. 10
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In the past, in dealing with criminals, the tendency has always
been to give the accused the benefit of every doubt, in order that an
innocent person may not be unjustly convicted. However, the pri-
mary purpose is after all to safeguard the general public welfare,
and, to do so, it is becoming increasingly necessary to tighten the
net around the criminal, shifting the emphasis from protection of the
accused to protection of the public. The public has gradually come
to a realization of the necessity for a remodeling of our crime laws
in order to cope with the situation, and the changes mentioned above
are probably only the beginning of a program of such changes.
ALICE FRIEDMAN.
COMMENTS ON LEGISLATION CONCERNING THE UNLAWFUL
PRACTICE OF THE LAw.-For the first time in the history of our
state jurisprudence, the Appellate Division in seeking to exercise its
supervisory powers over the legal profession, ordered a general inves-
tigation of the conduct of its members in regard to a particular line
of professional work-to wit, the Negligence Practice.' This investi-
gation placed the entire profession on the block of public contempt,
and although the stems of this illicit practice were cut by disbarment,
the roots of the evil remained intact. These evil roots were the acts
of unscrupulous individuals who solicited the cases. If the attorneys
retaining cases from these so-called solicitors, better known as "ambu-
lance chasers," were apprehended by justice, under our penal laws
then existent, 2 the counselors-at-law were disbarred 3 while the real
wrongdoer was permitted to continue his paltry business. According
to certain reports 4 written after the investigation, the general opin-
crowding him, or by placing a hand in the proximity of such person's pocket,
pocketbook or handbag); and unlawfully possessing- or distributing habit-
forming narcotic drugs. N. Y. CODE OF CRim. PRoc. §552, subd. 3b.
2Ambulance Chasing, N. Y. L. J., Oct. 8, 1928.
2 N. Y. PENAL LAW §274, before amended by N. Y. Laws of 1935, cc.
577, 578.
' Matter of Marlow, 225 App. Div. 252, 232 N. Y. Supp. 578 (2d Dept.
1929) ; Matter of Littack, 225 App. Div. 247, 232 N. Y. Supp. 571 (2d Dept.
1929). (Here the respondent was accused of splitting the fees on a number of
negligence cases brought by one Fabricant. The respondent's contention was
that the money given to Fabricant was for his fidelity in working with the
respondent. But the damaging evidence against the respondent was the testi-
mony given by a law-school graduate, who stated that in answer to an
advertisement for a clerk's position, the respondent told him that there would
be no salary, but if he brought in cases the fee would be split with the appli-
cant. The court was not unanimous in its decision, for Rich, J., held that the
respondent was not guilty of the offense of "splitting fees" with Fabricant, but
that Fabricant received a salary.) Matter of Katzka, 225 App. Div. 250,
232 N. Y. Supp. 575 (2d Dept. 1929).
'Nationwide War on "Ambulance Chasers" (1929) 15 A. B. A. J. 325-6;
Investigations of "Ambulance Chasers," The Source of the Evil (1928) 32
LAW NOTES 101.
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